How should changes in environmental quality occurring in the future be discounted? To answer this question we consider a model of "ecological discounting", where the representative consumer has a utility function defined over two attributes, consumption and environmental quality, which evolve stochastically over time. We characterize the determinants of the social discount rate and its behavior over time using a preference structure that disentangles attitudes towards intertemporal inequality, attitudes towards risk, and tastes over consumption and environmental quality. We show that the degree of substitutability between consumption and environmental quality, the degree of risk aversion, the degree of inequality aversion, and the rate at which these attitudes change as natural and man-made resources evolve over time are all important aspects of the ecological discount rate and its term structure. Our analysis suggests that over medium and long term horizons the ecological discount rate should be below the rate of time preference, supporting recent proposals for immediate action towards climate change mitigation.
Introduction
How should changes in environmental quality occurring in the future be discounted? Based on the perception that future generations will be wealthier in terms of material resources the classical approach calls for a positive, and sometimes high, discount rate. For example, using Ramsey's classic discounting rule, Nordhaus (1994 Nordhaus ( , 2007 proposes lenient policies towards climate change. Environmentalists are often skeptical of this approach. They see a deteriorating environment as justification for giving up large quantities of current resources for the benefit of future generations. In principle, neither of these views can be said to be right or wrong since they both represent the same basic attitude: a preference for intertemporal equality. The problem is that a stronger concern for intertemporal equality implies a higher discount rate in the classical approach. In fact, one of the main criticisms of the highly publicized Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2006) is that to attain a low discount rate it relies on the assumption of little social concern over intertemporal equality.
1
Where the classical approach and the environmentalist view likely differ is in the perceived degree of substitutability between consumption goods and environmental quality. By applying a unique rate to discount future consumption and environmental impacts, the classical economic approach presumes that consumption goods are perfect substitutes of environmental quality. This is a strong assumption. For example, Neumayer (1999) criticized the work of Nordhaus (1994) on global warming on the grounds that "the real problem of Nordhaus's methodology is his implicit underlying assumption of perfect substitutability between natural and other forms of capital." Neumayer then argued that "discounting is not the issue, but substitutability is." Although substitutability is indeed an important aspect of the debate on global warming, we believe that posing the debate in terms of the importance of substitutability relative to discounting is ill conceived. Instead, the challenge from a policymaking perspective is to understand how substitutability and other aspects of social preferences interact with the evolution of natural and man-made resources to determine an appropriate rate to discount environmental impacts.
Our objective in this paper is to take on this challenge by analyzing a model of social discounting with two main features:
 Uncertainty surrounding the evolution of material consumption and environmental quality, and  a social welfare function that is rich enough to disentangle tastes over consumption and environmental quality (e.g. substitutability), preferences towards risk, and preferences towards inequality over time.
To tackle the separation of tastes over consumption and environmental quality from attitudes towards risk we follow the classical literature on multivariate risk aversion developed by Debreu (1976) and Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974, 1981) , and we use the methods of Selden (1978 Selden ( , 1979 to disentangle risk preferences from intertemporal inequality preferences. In this context, we show that the appropriate rate to discount future environmental impacts, the ecological discount rate, depends critically on the interaction between the stochastic evolution of natural and man-made resources and the following aspects of social preferences:  The environmental share, which captures the weight that society attaches to environmental quality relative to material consumption,  the elasticity of substitution between material consumption and environmental quality (or its reciprocal, the resistance to intratemporal substitution),
 the rate at which the environmental share and the resistance to intratemporal substitution change as environmental quality and material consumption evolve over time,
 the degree of multivariate risk aversion and its rate of change, and  the resistance to intertemporal inequality and its rate of change.
At the outset, we remark that some of the aspects of the disentaglement that we propose have been considered before in the literature. In models with no uncertainty, a number of authors have analyzed the ecological discount rate and its behavior over time for the case in which social preferences display constant resistance to intra-temporal substitution and constant resistance to intertemporal inequality [e.g. Guesnerie (2004) , Hoel and Sterner (2007) , Sterner and Persson (2008) , Kögel (2009) , Gollier (2010a) , Traeger (2011) , and Gueant et al. (2012) ]. In a setting with stochastic future endowments, Gollier (2010a) evaluated the properties of the ecological discount rate within the context of a general bivariate utility function and also derived a closed form solution of the discount rate by restricting the resistance to intratemporal substitution to equal one and by setting the constant degree of relative risk aversion equal to the resistance to 2 The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 12 [2012] , Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 15 intertemporal inequality. Finally, in the classical context of social discounting with a single-attribute, Gollier (2002a) and Traeger (2008) use Selden's methods to separate risk aversion from aversion to intertemporal inequality.
Our contribution relative to the extant literature is three-fold. First, by using the Debreu-Kihlstrom-Mirman methods on multivariate preferences, this paper provides a well-grounded theoretical foundation for the different aspects of social preferences that have been discussed in the existing literature of ecological discounting without formal justification. Second, our framework provides a unified treatment of existing results, tying together the literature on ecological discounting and the literature on social discounting with Selden preferences. Finally, our model generalizes existing results in the ecological discounting literature, in that it does not restrict the level or the rate of change of risk aversion and of the resistances to substitution over the goods and over time. Unlike Gollier's (2010a) completely general analysis, our framework provides the minimum structure necessary to evaluate and to provide new insights on how these different attitudes interact with the stochastic evolution of the economy and the environment in order to determine the ecological discount rate.
In the classical discounting framework the social discount rate captures two effects in addition to pure time preferences. First, as mentioned above, there is a growth effect. If we expect future generations to be wealthier the social discount rate should be higher for a society averse to intertemporal inequality. Second, there is a precautionary effect. If there is uncertainty about the future, current generations will be more willing to transfer resources to the future, so the social discount rate will be lower. That is, the future risk reduces welfare for a risk averse society, and this deterioration in welfare calls for a compensation if the society is also averse to intertemporal inequality. Moreover, if risk aversion is decreasing the precautionary motive will be stronger because transferring resources to the future diminishes endogenously the "pain" of bearing the risk.
Similar arguments apply in the context of ecological discounting. First, there is an "ecological growth effect".
2 If the environment is expected to deteriorate, the discount rate should be lower for an inequality averse society (properly defined in a multivariate setting). Second, there is a "substitution effect". If future generations are wealthier in terms of material goods, aversion to inequality calls for a higher discount rate, as in the classical Ramsey's rule. But the other side of this argument is that complementarity between material goods and environmental quality implies that a society would like to match the higher expected level of consumption with a higher level of environmental quality, which will tend to depress the ecological discount rate. As a result, expected consumption growth increases the ecological discount rate only if aversion to intertemporal inequality is stronger than the resistance to substitute consumption and environmental quality. While these results have appeared before in the mentioned literature, our framework shows that the basic intuition still holds when there is uncertainty and when the resistances to intertemporal inequality and intratemporal substitution are not restricted to be constant.
Besides the ecological growth effect and the substitution effect, the ecological discount rate should be adjusted to capture precautionary motives. In particular, there is an "ecological prudence effect," which captures the effect of uncertainty about environmental quality, a "cross-prudence effect," which captures the effect of uncertainty about material consumption, and a "correlation effect," which arises if consumption and environmental quality tend to move together. We show that, as in the case with a single-attribute welfare function, each of these precautionary motives can be explained by a two-part compensation procedure: a direct compensation for facing the risk and an additional compensation that arises when transferring resources to the future changes the social perception of those risks. Our contribution is to isolate the different aspects of social preferences to establish precisely the different forces at play in this procedure. By doing so, we seek to bridge the gap and to provide an intuitive link between Gollier's (2010a) results using a general bivariate welfare function and the more restrictive power/Cobb-Douglas specification that he evaluates.
Our model also has important implications for the time behavior of the ecological discount rate.
3 It has been established in the literature of ecological discounting that if environmental concerns (i.e. the environmental share) increase as material consumption becomes relatively more abundant, the discount rate will tend to decrease over time if aversion to intertemporal inequality is stronger than the resistance to intratemporal substitution. Intuitively, in this case the substitution effect is positive but diminishes in strength as society becomes more environmentally conscious. In our model, there are two additional determinants of the time behavior of the discount rate under certainty. First, we show that under the reasonable assumption that the resistance to intratemporal substitution increases as material consumption becomes more abundant the ecological discount rate will tend to decrease over time. Second, if and when consumption concerns dominate welfare considerations (e.g. short horizons), higher resistance to intertemporal inequality implies a higher discount rate, as in Ramsey's classic rule, so the discount rate will tend to decrease over time if higher consumption decreases aversion to intertemporal inequality, as Gollier (2002 a,b) established when only consumption affects welfare. However, when environmental concerns dominate welfare considerations (e.g. long horizons), higher resistance to intertemporal inequality implies a lower discount rate, so in this case the discount rate will tend to decrease over time if the deteriorating environment increases aversion to inequality.
The rest of the paper is devoted to formalize these arguments. In the next Section we set up the baseline necessary for our analysis by introducing a specification of social preferences that disentangles the three aspects of preferences to which we have alluded. In Section 3 we derive the ecological discount rate, while in Section 4 we analyze the determinants of the ecological discount rate. Sections 5, 6, and 7 develop further intuition. We first present an example that allows us to solve for the discount rate in closed form. Then, in a setting without uncertainty, we analyze the behavior of the ecological discount rate as consumption and environmental quality evolve over time. Finally, we evaluate numerically the determinants of the EDR and its behavior over time under uncertainty. Section 8 contains some concluding remarks, while all the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Social Preferences
Following Smith (2010, 2011) , we consider a specification of social preferences that disentangles the three aspects of preferences to which we have alluded: risk aversion, aversion to intertemporal inequality, and tastes over material consumption and environmental quality. The social planner evaluates discounted social welfare at two points in time, and , as follows
where and are the levels of material consumption and environmental quality, respectively, at time , is the rate of pure time preference and is the expectations operator. We assume that ( ) is linearly homogeneous, with positive and diminishing marginal utilities, and that the functions ( ) and ( ) are monotonically increasing and concave These preferences incorporate two key elements. First, to disentangle risk preferences from preferences over the two goods we apply the methods of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974, 1981) . Second, to disentangle risk preferences from intertemporal inequality preferences we use the specification of Selden (1978 Selden ( , 1979 . We will explain each of these aspects next.
Disentangling Risk Preferences from Preferences Over the Goods
In their classic work on multivariate risk aversion Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974, 1981) addressed the fundamental question of what risk aversion means when there are multiple goods in the utility function. Extending Pratt's (1964) definition of comparative risk aversion, Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) proposed that, for two utility functions, say ( ) and ( ), ( ) is more risk averse than ( ) if and only if the former is obtained by an increasing concave transformation of the latter. Importantly, they showed that comparative risk aversion in a multi-dimensional framework is only feasible if we compare utility functions which represent the same ordinal preference ordering. 4 Kihlstrom and Mirman (1981) extended their previous ideas by defining the concepts of increasing, constant, and decreasing risk aversion in the context of multiple commodities. They point out three related problems when trying to extent the univariate theory to the case of multiple commodities. First, following their previous results, they argued that to properly define the concepts of constant, decreasing, and increasing risk aversion in a multi-dimensional framework it is necessary to "compare the risk averseness of the utility function at two points only if there is an appropriate sense in which the ordinal preferences represented by the utility function are the same at each of the two points" (pg.272). To solve this problem they proposed to restrict attention to homothetic preferences over the attributes (i.e. those preferences for which the marginal rate of substitution remains constant along rays through the origin).
Second, they argued that to appropriately define the concept of changing risk aversion one should use a base utility function that plays the role of the affine function in the univariate theory of risk aversion. To solve this problem they proposed the least concave representation of ordinal preferences as the natural counterpart of the affine function. The least concave representation of ordinal preferences is defined as the utility function ( ) that has the property that any other concave function ( ) representing the same ordinal preference ordering is given by ( ) ( ( )) where the function ( ) is monotonically increasing and concave. Kihlstrom and Mirman (1981) demonstrated that when preferences are homothetic the least concave representation is linearly homogeneous.
Finally, they argued that when there are many attributes in the utility function it is not entirely clear what increasing or decreasing risk aversion means: some attributes may be increasing and others decreasing. To solve this problem Kihlstrom and Mirman proposed to "use utility in a very natural way as the variable in which increases are to be measured" (pg.272). In particular, a utility function that has a least concave representation ( ), and so ( ) ( ( )) is said to be an increasing, constant, or decreasing absolute (relative) risk averse representation of a preference ordering if is an increasing, constant, or decreasing absolute (relative) risk averse function of a single variable. This characterization is consistent with Debreu's (1976) The function ( ) is a concave transformation of ( ) and so, à la Pratt (1964) , implies more risk averse behavior. The linearly homogeneous function ( ) is the least concave utility function among all homothetic functions and plays the role of the affine function in the univariate theory of risk aversion. It is also the variable in which changes in risk aversion are to be measured. The punch line is that we can think of ( ) as governing preferences over material consumption and environmental quality and we can think of the curvature of ( ) as determining risk aversion with respect to the "aggregator" ( ) Consistent with this decomposition, we provide the following definitions.
Definition 1. The degree of relative risk aversion of is
⁄ . The elasticity of relative risk aversion is ⁄
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Definition 1 corresponds to Kihlstrom and Mirman's (1981) characterization of changing risk aversion. Next, we define the strength of preference for environmental amenities relative to material consumption at a given point in time and in a given state of nature.
Definition 2. The environmental share is
⁄ and the consumption share is ⁄ .
As argued by Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2002) , if we think of as the implicit price of environmental amenities, then is the total value of environmental amenities and is the value of these amenities as a share of the value of all commodities ( ). In other words, captures the weight that 5 In particular, a one percent increase in (e.g. if both and increase by one percent) increases relative risk aversion by percent. society places on environmental amenities relative to material consumption evaluated at a given bundle ( ). Finally, we define the degree of substitutability at a given point in time and in a given state of nature.
Definition 3. The resistance to intratemporal substitution is ⁄ 6
We also define the elasticities and .
The resistance to intratemporal substitution captures the degree of difficulty with which consumption and environmental quality can be substituted for each other, in the sense that a one percent increase in the relative abundance of material consumption decreases the rate of substitution ⁄ by percent. By linear homogeneity, , i.e. the goods must be weak complements, a reasonable assumption for consumption goods and environmental quality.
We will also say, using the terminology of Traeger (2011) , that preferences display strongly limited substitutability if the resistance to intratemporal substitution is higher than one, , and that preferences display moderate substitutability if the resistance to intratemporal substitution is lower than one, (including the case of perfect substitutability). It is simple to show that the environmental share increases with if there is strongly limited substitutability and it decreases with if there is moderate substitutability. When the resistance to intratemporal substitution equals one (i.e Cobb-Douglas utility), , the environmental share is independent of . While we personally judge the strongly limited substitutability scenario as more reasonable, we are not dogmatic about this point, so we evaluate all three possible cases.
Disentangling Risk Preferences from Intertemporal Inequality Preferences
To disentangle risk aversion from aversion to intertemporal inequality we use an ordinal-certainty-equivalent representation in the spirit of Selden (1978 Selden ( , 1979 . Specifically, we imagine a social planner who evaluates welfare in two steps. First, he calculates the certainty-equivalent of date-t base utility ( ),
Second, he aggregates certainty-utilities as in Eq. (1), 6 This is classical definition of resistance to substitution (e.g. Hicks, 1932) for linearly homogeneous functions, 
The function [ ] is a concave transformation of date-certainty-utility [the aggregator ( )] and date-t certainty-equivalent utility [ ( )] As in the case of the Debreu-Kihlstrom-Mirman decomposition, such a transformation implies a stronger distaste for fluctuations of base utilities. But at this level of aggregation, the curvature of the function ( ) captures aversion to inequality in the form of utility fluctuations over time. Consistent with this characterization, we provide the following definition.
Definition 4. The resistance to intertemporal inequality is ⁄ . The elasticity of the resistance to intertemporal inequality is
Clearly, when ( ) ( ) social preferences take the standard intertemporal expected utility form, so and , and utility fluctuations across states of nature are perceived as equivalent as utility fluctuations across generations.
Examples
To fix ideas, let us introduce two functional forms of social preferences that we will use later. First, there is the canonical power/Cobb-Douglas specification, which is given by
where and 7 The functions inside the parentheses are linearly homogeneous. It follows that the measure of relative risk aversion in this case is and the measure of aversion to intertemporal inequality is It is well known that Cobb-Douglas preferences imply unitary resistance to substitution, and constant shares, and Second, we will frequently refer to the following functional form,
7 As usual, when and when where (
with and As before, this specification implies that aversion to intertemporal inequality and relative risk aversion are constant. The function inside the parentheses (see e.g. Revankar 1971 ) has as a special case CES utility, obtained when (i.e. in that case ). Clearly, CobbDouglas and perfect substitution are also special cases. If the parameter is different from zero the elasticity of substitution varies with the level of consumption and environmental quality. Without much originality, we will refer to this specification as VES (variable elasticity of substitution) utility. In particular, we have
where, to recall, Under this specification, the resistance to intratemporal substitution increases with the level of so and , which captures the reasonable assumption that wealthier economies with poor environmental quality will be less willing to substitute consumption and environmental quality. If this specification displays strongly limited substitutability everywhere, so the environmental share is increasing in this case. As the resistance to substitution approaches ( ) If the resistance to substitution approaches one from below as , so there is moderate substitutability but a constant environmental share (equal to ) in the limit.
Ecological Discounting
To define the ecological discount rate we follow Gollier (2010a) and imagine a marginal project that increases future environmental quality by a sure (small) amount and that decreases current environmental quality by . Implementing this project would increase social welfare if the net tradeoff is positive:
.
Equivalently, the rule can be written as
where ̂ is the minimum threshold that the project must exceed to be socially efficient, or simply, the ecological discount rate (henceforth EDR). The economic discount rate is derived in a similar fashion. Because the qualitative results for the two different discount rates are symmetric, we will focus exclusively on the ecological discount rate. Special cases of Eq. (5) have previously been used to analyze the properties of the social discount rate. The discount rate derived by Gollier (2002a) and Traeger (2008) under Selden preferences arises as a special of Eq. (5) when consumption and environmental quality are perfect substitutes (e.g. Eq. (3) with and ). In models with no uncertainty, a number of authors have analyzed the case in which the function ( ) displays constant resistance to intratemporal substitution and ( ) displays constant resistance to intertemporal inequality -Eq. (3) with -with a special focus on the time behavior of the EDR [e.g. Guesnerie (2004) , Hoel and Sterner (2007) , Sterner and Persson (2008) , Kögel (2009 ), Gollier (2010a , Traeger (2011), and Gueant et al. (2012) ]. In a model with stochastic future endowments, Gollier (2010a) derived a closed form solution of (5) by further restricting the resistance to intratemporal substitution to equal one and relative risk aversion to equal the resistance to intertemporal inequality (i.e. Eq. (2) with ). As pointed out in the introduction, our contribution is to interpret these different aspects of social preferences based on the ideas of Debreu (1976) and Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974, 1981) , to unify the results of the different strands of the literature on social discounting, and to extend these results using a preference structure that does not restrict the level or the rate of change of risk aversion and of the resistances to substitution over time and over goods. As we shall demonstrate, these extensions play a key role in the determination of the different precautionary effects and in the determination of the discount rate for projects with different time horizons.
Remark. It is well known that non-expected utility models may lead to time consistency problems. In our model the social planner evaluates a social welfare function with two dates, 0 and t, and as any other two-date model it does not suffer from time consistency. Furthermore, in our model the social planner does not solve for the optimal path of consumption. Instead, the idea is that the social planner evaluates the two dates for which a given marginal social project provides benefits and costs. In this sense, our approach follows a number of recent papers dealing with the disentanglement of different aspects of social preferences. For example, Gollier and Gierlinger (2008) use the same two-date setting with a certainty-equivalent specification to separate risk aversion from ambiguity aversion, while Emmerling (2010) uses the same two-date setting to disentangle intertemporal and intratemporal inequality aversion. However, if we were to model the intertemporal welfare function over the entire horizon and evaluate optimal plans, then aggregating the certainty equivalent levels at different point in time may lead to dynamic inconsistency unless we use recursive methods. Unfortunately, although it would be very interesting to solve for the equilibrium risk-free rate in a model à la Ramsey, but with two-commodities and using the recursive specification of, for example, Epstein and Zin (1989) , which is timeconsistent, such a model is in general not tractable
The Determinants of the Ecological Discount Rate

Local Analysis
To analyze the determinants of the EDR we will begin by considering an approximation of the time EDR around the initial levels of consumption and environmental quality, ( ) This is justified only for short time horizons and small risks, but as we shall see, it will also provide intuition for our more general results.
Defining the expected annualized growth rate of over the period ( ) as , and the annualized covariance of and , over the period ( ) as , 8 a second order Taylor series approximation of Eq. (5) 
where the different terms of (6) are given by, 9  The "ecological growth effect": , with
8 In particular, ( ) ⁄ and ( )( ) ⁄ . 9 All the functions are evaluated at ( ).

The "substitution effect": , with
 The "ecological prudence effect": , with
where , and
 The "cross-prudence effect": , with
where and [
 The "correlation effect": , with
where
The approximation states that the way in which the stochastic evolution of consumption and environmental quality affect the EDR is determined by the complex interaction of 1) the consumption and environmental quality shares, and 2) the degree of risk aversion, and its rate of change, 3) the resistance to intertemporal inequality, and 4) the resistance to intratemporal substitution, and its rate of change with environmental quality, Let us provide some intuition for each of the effects.
Ecological growth and substitution effects
The first two terms in Eq. (6) correspond to the determinants of the EDR that would arise in a world without uncertainty. The ecological growth effect can be written as a weighted average of the resistance to intertemporal inequality and the resistance to intratemporal substitution , with the weights given by the environmental share and the consumption share, respectively. It is negative if we expect environmental quality to deteriorate over time,
. In essence, this is symmetric to the economic growth effect in the univariate Ramsey rule.
More interesting is the substitution effect. The approximation states that economic growth increases the EDR if the resistance to intertemporal inequality is stronger than the resistance to intratemporal substitution. This condition is quite intuitive. Consider, for example, the most plausible scenario of an increasing consumption profile. Aversion to inequality over time implies that, in response to an expected increase in future consumption, society will be less willing to transfer current utility to the 'better' future. This "intergenerational equity effect" calls for a higher EDR. However, complementarity between consumption and environmental quality implies that society would like to match the higher expected level of consumption with a higher level of environmental quality since the return from a higher quality in the environment is higher in that case. This "complementarity effect" tends to depress the EDR. In other words, given a higher level of future consumption society faces a trade-off between stability of utility over time and stability of utility in the commodity space.
Such a trade-off has been captured before in the literature of ecological discounting in settings without uncertainty under the assumption that social welfare displays constant resistance to intratemporal substitution and constant resistance to intertemporal inequality (e.g. Hoel and Sterner (2007) , Traeger (2011 ), Gueant et al. (2012 ). By using the Debreu-Kihlstrom-Mirman decomposition we have been able to provide a precise meaning to the different aspects of social preferences that have been discussed in the literature. Furthermore, this decomposition shows that the difference between the resistance to substitution over goods and the resistance to intertemporal inequality is still the main determinant of the substitution effect when there is uncertainty about the future endowments (note that risk aversion plays no role) and when these attitudes are not restricted to be constant. We will demonstrate later that changes in the resistances to substitution over goods and across generations, as well as changes in the environmental share, are crucial to understand the magnitude of the ecological growth effect and of the substitution effect for environmental projects with different horizons. At this point we remark three aspects implied by our approximation that will play a key role in that analysis.
First, in the empirically relevant case that the relative abundance of material consumption grows over time (i.e. ), a higher resistance to substitute consumption and environmental quality implies a lower EDR under certainty. Disregarding substitutability leads to an understatement of the present value of future environmental impacts. Second, a stronger resistance to intertemporal inequality increases or decreases the EDR under certainty according to Therefore, contrary Ramsey's classic rule, if the environment is deteriorating over time and the environmental share is sufficiently large, a society more averse to intertemporal inequality will use a lower rate to discount environmental impacts.
Finally, consider an increase in the environmental quality share , again under certainty. Such change could be described as a "more environmentally conscious" shift. One would expect that, as a result of such a shift, environmental projects would be discounted at a lower rate. However, under the reasonable assumption that the ratio grows over time, this will only be true if . In other words, if the resistance to intratemporal substitution is higher than the resistance to intertemporal inequality a more-environmentally-conscious society will use a higher rate to discount environmental impacts. 10 The intuition for this paradoxical result is that in an economy with the substitution effect is negative and consumption growth decreases the EDR. An increased concern for environmental quality relative to consumption then implies that the substitution effect and the ecological growth effect become less powerful, and this increases the EDR.
This means, for example, that economies that are richer in terms of material consumption and are more environmentally conscious (e.g. under strongly limited substitutability) will use a higher EDR if . Of course, if the higher level of consumption also leads to a higher resistance to intratemporal substitution, or to a higher resistance to intertemporal inequality and welfare considerations are driven by environmental concerns ( ), the richer economies may still use a lower discount rate.
Ecological prudence, cross-prudence, and correlation effects
Consider next the effects of uncertainty. The intuition for the different precautionary effects is best understood by thinking about precautionary saving (a stronger precautionary saving motive implies a lower equilibrium discount rate). In a univariate setting Drèze and Modigliani (1972) were the first to note that the precautionary saving motive can be explained as a two-part compensation procedure. First, saving is higher to compensate for the negative effect of the future risk on welfare. Second, if risk aversion is decreasing, there is an additional motive to save because greater saving diminishes endogenously the expected pain that the consumer faces in light of the risk. This is true under intertemporal expected utility and, as shown by Kimball and Weil (2009) , also under Selden preferences. Kimball and Weil (2009) use this result to show that decreasing risk aversion is sufficient for a positive precautionary saving motive under Selden preferences, while Gollier (2002a) and Traeger (2008) use this result to show that decreasing risk aversion is sufficient for the presence of a future risk to reduce the social discount rate under Selden preferences.
In essence, the same intuition applies to the case of multiple commodities and multiple risks. Consider, for example, the cross prudence effect. First, there is a direct compensation for the effect that the economic risk has on social welfare. This is captured by the interaction between social attitudes towards economic risks, and the social willingness (or unwillingness) to compensate future consumption harms with higher environmental quality, Social attitudes towards economic risks can be represented by a utility-weighted average of risk aversion and the resistance to intratemporal substitution, and it is always positive. On the other hand, as in the case of the substitution effect, the social willingness to compensate a future consumption harm (in this case in the form of risk) captures the trade-off between intergenerational equity and complementarity between consumption and environmental quality, so the future harm will reduce the EDR if attitudes towards intertemporal equality are stronger than attitudes towards substitution between the goods (i.e.
). Second, a change in the level of environmental quality will change the way in which future generations experience risks. If a higher level of environmental quality diminishes the expected pain that future generations face in light of the risk (i.e. is decreasing in ) then an additional compensation is in order and the EDR will be lower. If, on the other hand, a higher level of environmental quality increases the expected pain for future generations (i.e. is increasing in ), then the current generation does not need to compensate future generations as much and the EDR will be higher. More precisely, our decomposition shows that the rate of change of depends on how changes in the level of environmental quality affects a) the consumption and environmental utility-weights (shares), captured by the magnitude of relative to one, b) relative risk aversion, captured by the elasticity , and c) the resistance to intratemporal substitution, captured by the elasticity A similar interpretation can be provided for the different terms of the ecological prudence effect and the correlation effect. For the ecological prudence effect the direct compensation for the future environmental risk is given by the term ( ) which is always positive, and there is an additional compensation if a higher level of environmental quality reduces the expected pain that society faces in light of the risk (i.e. if ). For the correlation effect, the direct compensation is positive if social preferences display aversion to correlation. This occurs under the Debreu-Kihlstrom-Mirman decomposition if relative risk aversion is stronger than the resistance to intratemporal substitution. Furthermore, there is an additional compensation if aversion to correlation is lower at higher levels of environmental quality. Going back to Eq. (6), and now considering all the precautionary effects together, we can conclude that  A higher resistance to intertemporal inequality strengthens the precautionary effects, decreasing the EDR.

The impact of a higher degree of relative risk aversion and of a higher resistance to substitution over the goods on the strength of the precautionary effects is ambiguous.
 Decreasing relative risk aversion and an increasing resistance to intratemporal substitution with lower levels of environmental quality will strengthen the precautionary effects, decreasing the EDR.
Our next objective is to analyze the determinants of the ecological discount rate for more general changes in the distribution of future resources.
A Global Result
While the approximation in Eq. (6) is only justified for short horizons and small risks, the following Proposition shows that the results established above are closely related to the effects of first and second order stochastic shifts of consumption and environmental quality at time on the EDR (See Appendix A).
Proposition 1. Suppose that social preferences are given by Eq. (1) and that aversion to intertemporal inequality is no lower than relative risk aversion, . Then 11
11 To remind the reader, an FSD dominated shift can be obtained by adding noise ̃ to the original risk ̃ such that P [ ̃ ] for all possible states. An increase in risk in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) -i.e. a mean preserving spread-can be obtained by adding a mean zero noise ̃ to the original risk ̃. A correlation increasing transformation, as defined by Epstein and Tanny (1980) 
(v) Correlation effect: Positive statistical dependence between consumption and environmental quality, in the sense of Epstein and Tanny (1980), decreases the EDR if , as defined in Eq. (11), is positive for all and , and for all and .
In essence, the intuition of the different conditions in Proposition 1 is the same as that for the local analysis in the previous section. A natural question that arises at this point, however, is the following: How is Proposition 1 related to Gollier's (2010a) analysis under intertemporal expected utility and a general utility function ( )? The answer is simple: When the conditions established in Proposition 1 are equivalent to the necessary and sufficient conditions obtained by Gollier (2010a, Propositions 2, 3, and 4) in terms of partial derivatives of the general utility function (e.g. ( ) ( ) when ). Our contribution has been to isolate the different aspects of social preferences to understand precisely what these conditions mean and to extend Gollier's results to the case in which social preferences towards risk and towards inequality differ. In other words, Proposition 1 complements the results of Gollier, by bridging the gap and by providing an intuitive link between the general model and the more restrictive power/Cobb-Douglas specification that he evaluates. Moreover, the Proposition extends Gollier's results by considering a specification of social preferences where attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards intertemporal inequality are not restricted to be the same. towards realizations where both consumption and environmental quality are high or low rather than one of them being high and the other being low. We refer the reader to Gollier (2010a) for a precise definition of the stochastic dominance orders in the bivariate case.
To provide further intuition we proceed in three steps. First, in the next Section we revisit Gollier's analysis of the ecological discount rate under power/Cobb-Douglas preferences, but using Selden's disentanglement of risk aversion and inequality aversion. Then, in Section 6, we evaluate how the evolution over time of natural and material resources affects the EDR under certainty. Finally, in Section 7 we evaluate numerically the determinants of the EDR and its behavior over time under uncertainty and the more general variable elasticity of substitution specification.
Power/Cobb-Douglas utility
Suppose that social welfare is given by the power/Cobb-Douglas specification in Eq. (2). Furthermore, suppose that ( ) is jointly normally distributed with mean ( ) and variance-covariance matrix [ ] When this is precisely the example analyzed by Gollier (2010a). The following Proposition, which we prove in Appendix B, presents the EDR in closed-form in the more general case in which attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards inequality are allowed to differ.
Proposition 2. Suppose that social preferences are given by specification (2) and that consumption and environmental quality are jointly log-normally distributed. Then, the ecological discount rate is given by
In the case of power/Cobb-Douglas preferences the approximation in Eq. (6) holds exactly and the elasticities are all equal to zero because the shares, the resistance to intratemporal substitution, and relative risk aversion are all constant. The different terms in (12) can easily be linked to the terminology used before:
is the ecological growth effect
is the ecological prudence effect
is the cross-prudence effect
is the correlation effect As we showed above, the ecological growth effect and the substitution effect are determined exclusively by preferences towards intertemporal equality and preferences over the goods; risk aversion does not matter. An expected deterioration in environmental quality reduces the EDR while an expected improvement in material consumption implies a higher or lower EDR depending on whether the resistance to intertemporal inequality is larger or smaller than the resistance to intratemporal substitution (which equals 1 in the Cobb-Douglas case). This same condition ( ) establishes whether an environmentally conscious shift -an increase in -decreases or increases the EDR under certainty.
The separation of preferences towards risk and towards intertemporal equality is also critical for understanding the precautionary effects of risk on the EDR. This is particularly the case for the cross-prudence effect and the correlation effect, as we highlight in the following corollary.
Corollary to Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, an increase in consumption risk decreases the EDR if and only if Risk aversion only affects the magnitude of this effect, decreasing (increasing) the EDR if ( ) Positive dependence decreases the EDR if and only if . Aversion to intertemporal inequality only affects the magnitude of the correlation effect, decreasing (increasing) the EDR if
( )
The fact that the sign of the cross-prudence effect is independent of risk aversion is quite surprising. The intuition, however, was provided in the previous Section. Under power/Cobb-Douglas preferences, the cross-prudence effect is determined exclusively by the interaction of social attitudes towards economic risks, [ ( )( )], and social willingness to compensate future consumption harms with higher environmental quality, ( )( ). As in the case of expected changes in consumption (i.e. the substitution effect), the latter aspect captures the trade-off between stability of utility over time and stability of utility in the commodity space, and it is this trade-off that determines the sign of the cross prudence effect.
An analogy may help to fix ideas. Given Cobb-Douglas preferences, a proportional consumption risk is to the marginal utility of environmental quality what a proportional risk (e.g. interest rate risk) is to the marginal utility of saving in a univariate model. It is well known [e.g. Selden (1979) , Weil (1990) ] that, given constant relative risk aversion and constant resistance to intertemporal substitution, interest rate risk increases savings if the resistance to intertemporal substitution is greater than one. Exactly the same condition holds for cross prudence when preferences over the goods are Cobb-Douglas.
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On the other hand, as implied by the corollary, the sign of the correlation effect is determined by the magnitude of risk aversion relative to the resistance to intratemporal substitution, while the resistance to intertemporal inequality only affects the magnitude of this effect. Importantly, contrary to the case of intertemporal expected utility, the correlation effect and the cross-prudence effect do not necessarily have the same sign.
The Behavior of the Discount Rate Over Time
To analyze the evolution of the EDR as natural and material resources change over time, let us disregard uncertainty for the moment, in which case only the substitution effect and the ecological growth effect are operative and attitudes towards risk (the function ( )) do not affect the discount rate. If, following Gollier (2010a), we further assume that the growth rate of consumption and of environmental quality are constant and equal to and respectively, we obtain the following characterization of the EDR
where, as defined before, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) and ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )] According to Eq. (13) the EDR is decreasing (resp. increasing) if the bracketed terms are decreasing (resp. increasing) over time. This has an obvious intuition: if the ecological growth effect and the substitution effect determine the time discount rate, the ecological discount rate decreases with the time horizon if the magnitude of these effects is decreasing over time. The following Proposition establishes precisely the factors that determine the time behavior of the EDR (see Appendix C).
Proposition 3. Under certainty the EDR is decreasing, constant, or increasing with the time horizon according to (each term being a function of )
The different parts of Eq. (14) correspond to the time behavior of the three aspects of preferences that determine the ecological growth effect and the substitution effect: the environmental share, the resistance to intratemporal substitution, and the resistance to intertemporal inequality. The time behavior of the environmental share (first part of Eq. (14)) has been analyzed thoroughly in the extant literature under the assumption of constant resistance to intertemporal inequality and constant resistance to intratemporal substitution.
13 Under these assumptions, the time behavior of the EDR is determined exclusively by the sign of ( )( ) The intuition for this condition can be related to our previous discussion regarding what we called environmentally conscious shifts. Under the empirically relevant case that material consumption becomes relatively more abundant over time, strongly limited substitutability ( ( ) ) leads to a stronger concern for environmental quality over time. One would then expect longer horizon environmental projects to be discounted at a lower rate. However, we showed before that societies that are more environmentally conscious use lower rates to discount environmental projects only if the resistance to intertemporal inequality is higher than the resistance to substitution over the goods (i.e. only if ( ) ( )), so it is only in this case that the EDR will decrease over time. Instead, in an economy with strongly limited substitutability and ( ) ( ), an increased concern for environmentally quality increases the EDR over time.
The paradoxical possibility that an increase in the environmental share increases the EDR whenever the resistance to substitution over the goods is stronger than the resistance to interteporal inequality does not disappear under weak substitutability. However, under weak substitutability the economy becomes less environmentally conscious (the environmental share decreases) as increases over time, so in that case the EDR for longer horizon projects is lower or higher according to ( ) ( ). For Cobb-Douglas utility the consumption and environmental quality shares are constant, so the EDR is independent of the time behavior of . Traeger (2011) demonstrates that an important implication of these results is that the EDR could be higher under strongly limited substitutability than under moderate substitutability (or under Cobb-Douglas utility).
When the resistances to substitution over the goods and over time are not constant, other effects come into play. It is reasonable to presume, for example, that an economy with relatively abundant material resources will be less willing to substitute consumption and environmental quality (or equivalently, ) . This implies that, as material resources become relatively more abundant over time, the resulting increases in the resistance to intratemporal substitution will tend to decrease the EDR. This is not to say, however, that increasing resistance to intratemporal substitution is sufficient for a monotonically decreasing discount rate. The reason is that such changes interact closely with the way in which changes in the environmental share affect the time behavior of the EDR. To illustrate this through a simple example consider a situation in which is constant, ( ) , and ( ) is increasing in the level of consumption. The fact that ( ) implies that the substitution effect is not operative for short horizons, so the short-term EDR equals the rate of time preference. As ( ) increases the EDR decreases and remains below the rate of time preference due to the negative substitution effect. Yet, as environmental concerns become more important over time (under the working assumption of strongly limited substitutability), the substitution effect diminishes in strength and, in the limit, the EDR returns to the level of the rate of time preference. In other words, the term structure of the EDR is U shaped. 14 Finally, the last part of Eq. (14) arises due to the possibly changing degree of inequality aversion at different levels of resources over time. We showed before that increases in the resistance to intertemporal inequality increase the EDR under the condition ; that is, if consumption concerns dominate welfare considerations. But also implies that utility increases with the time horizon. Under moderate substitutability and perfect substitutability, is positive for large levels of because material consumption eventually dominates welfare considerations even if the environment is deteriorating. Therefore, if the resistance to intertemporal inequality is decreasing (resp. increasing) the EDR will fall (resp. increase) as the time horizon lengthens. On the other hand, under strongly limited substitutability environmental concerns eventually dominate welfare considerations. Therefore, if the environment is deteriorating and is decreasing (resp. increasing) the EDR 14 Of course, the specific shape of the term structure of the EDR depends on the initial values of and and on their behavior over time. The important message is that allowing them to change over time permits a much richer modeling of the time behavior of the EDR.
will increase (resp. decrease) as the time horizon lengthens -at least for long horizons when .
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Importantly, under the reasonable assumption that the resistance to intratemporal substitution does not decrease as material resources become relatively more abundant, changes in the degree of inequality aversion over time are likely to be the main determinant of the time behavior of the EDR for long horizons.
16 Under moderate and perfect substitutability the consumption share approaches one and further increases in consumption (assuming ) decrease the EDR if the resistance to intertemporal inequality is decreasing. Under strongly limited substitutability the environmental share approaches one and further deteriorations of environmental quality (assuming ) decrease the EDR if the resistance to inequality is increasing. These results provide a formal correspondence between the time behavior of the ecological discount rate and the results of Gollier (2002 a,b) , who found that decreasing resistance to intertemporal inequality is necessary and sufficient for a decreasing term structure when social preferences are defined over a single attribute that increases over time.
Remark. If we assume that and converge to positive constants, say ( ) ̂ and ( ) ̂ , and under the plausible scenario that , we obtain, as Gollier (2010a) and others did assuming constant resistance to intertemporal and intratemporal substitution, that the limiting behavior of the EDR is given by
15 In the most likely scenario that the current level of welfare is increasing with marginal changes in consumption and environmental quality, the effect of changes in on the EDR will be non-monotonic under strongly limited substitutability (e.g. if is increasing the EDR will tend to increase and then decrease as the time horizon lengthens). 16 If does not decrease with the shares are either constant or approach zero or one for long horizons, so the first part of Eq. (14) becomes negligible. Furthermore, will either approach a constant level below one or it will increase above one, in which case the consumption share approaches zero. In either case, the second part of Eq. (14) becomes negligible.
We point out three important aspects of the long-term EDR. First, as long as ̂ the long term EDR is lower than the long term economic discount rate and the discount rate implied by Ramsey's rule in the univariate framework (which obtains when ̂ , i.e. perfect substitution between consumption and environmental quality, so ̂ ( ) ̂ ). Second, as shown by Traeger (2011), the long-term EDR is higher under strongly limited substitutability than under moderate substitutability if ̂ and ̂ ̂. In the numerical analysis that follows we restrict attention to the case with ̂ , which we believe to be the most likely scenario. Third, under strongly limited substitutability (i.e. ̂ ) a stronger concern for intertemporal equality (i.e. a higher ̂) decreases the long-term EDR if the environment is deteriorating
Numerical Analysis
As pointed out by Gollier (2010a) , calibrating the model is problematic, even with exact solutions, due to the lack of time series data on environmental quality. To circumvent this problem Gollier assumes that environmental quality is a deterministic monotonic function of material consumption. In particular, he assumes that . Although clearly restrictive, given the current state of knowledge this assumption seems to be as valid as any other simple functional relationship. We will therefore also maintain this assumption to provide further intuition.
Given power/Cobb-Douglas preferences (Eq. (2)) and when is normally distributed with mean ( ) and variance , the EDR can again be solved in closed form,
where we defined ̂ ( ( ))( ) and ̂ ( ( ))( ). To calibrate this model we need values for the rate of pure time preference , for the parameter which captures the strength with which environmental quality responds to changes in material consumption, for the environmental share , for the parameters and , which capture aversion to intertemporal inequality and relative risk aversion, respectively, and estimates for the growth process of consumption. Following Gollier (2010a) we set and Using these parameters and assuming , Gollier (2010a) obtained that the EDR is about 1.5%, with only a small effect of uncertainty (under certainty the EDR would be about 1.65%). The low degree of consumption growth volatility together with the slowly decreasing level of environmental quality implies that the substitution effect is the most significant determinant of the EDR [( )( ) ]. Gollier (2011) recently showed that the low degree of consumption volatility for the U.S. ( ) is close to the volatility of other developed countries, but substantially lower than the volatility in less developed countries. Suppose, then, that we use the average consumption growth volatility for all 190 countries in Gollier's (2011) data: . We then obtain that the EDR is about 1.35%; again, not a large precautionary effect.
17
Contrary to the assumption of the intertemporal expected utility model, most empirical evidence suggests that the resistance to substitute intertemporally is stronger than relative risk aversion [e.g. Hall (1988) , Epstein and Zin (1991) , Barsky et al (1997) ], implying a strong preference for smoothing resources over time. Closer to our framework, Atkinson et al. (2009) recently developed an experimental setting to evaluate intergenerational substitution and again found a very high resistance to substitution (they found a resistance to intergenerational substitution close to 9). Furthermore, as we mentioned in the introduction, one of the main criticisms of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change is its assumption of little social concern over intertemporal equality (the Review uses a resistance to inequality equal to one). Consistent with this and to be conservative suppose that Then, we obtain that the EDR is about 3.2% when (2.8% when and 3.4% under certainty). Clearly, the separation of risk aversion and intertemporal inequality can have a large impact on the EDR. Although it may be discomforting that a stronger preference for intertemporal equality implies a much higher ecological discount rate the intuition is simple. An increase in tends to increase the EDR through the substitution effect, while it tends to decrease the EDR through the ecological growth effect and the effect of uncertainty. Since the expected growth rate of consumption is the main driving force for the level of the EDR, the impact of an increase in will then be to increase the EDR (even though a stronger concern over inequality also implies a substantially stronger precautionary effect). Moreover, since the consumption and environmental quality shares are constant under the Cobb-Douglas specification, the effect will be the same for all time horizons.
The assumption that the resistance to intratemporal substitution is constant and equal to one, however, is a strong one. We argued before that a plausible scenario is to have a higher resistance to intratemporal substitution as consumption increases relative to environmental quality. To evaluate numerically the potential impact of such consideration we use the VES functional presented in Eq. (3). Although this more general specification is attractive from a modeling perspective, it does not permit a closed form solution for the ecological discount rate. Therefore, to obtain a numerical value for the EDR we proceed as follows (See Appendix E for details). First, we simulate assuming that it has a lognormal distribution with the same expected growth and volatility as before (under both scenarios and ). Then, for a given time , we calculate the EDR in Eq. (5) using the values obtained in the simulations. Except for the values of the parameters and , the values of the other parameters remain as before. Furthermore, we maintain the assumption that the current environmental share equals 0.3. Figure 1 shows a scenario in which the current value of is somewhat higher than one ( ( ) ) and preferences display strongly limited substitutability everywhere (i.e.
( ) for all and ). For purposes of comparison, in Figure 2 we present the EDR under a constant resistance to substitution (CES) function with the same initial environmental share and resistance to intratemporal substitution.
A number of interesting patterns, which are consistent with our previous discussion, emerge from these graphs.
18 First, like the Cobb-Douglas example, the positive and large substitution effect dominates in the short-run, implying a relatively high short-term discount rate. However, unlike the Cobb-Douglas case, the ecological growth effect dominates in the very long-run, implying a long-term discount rate substantially below the rate of time preference. Intuitively, in the long-run environmental concerns dominate welfare evaluations (due to ), the substitution effect becomes negligible and the negative environmental growth effect becomes the main determinant of the EDR. In other words, a strong preference for intertemporal equality implies a higher EDR for short horizons (due to its interaction with economic growth) but a lower EDR for very long time horizons (due to its interaction with a deteriorating environment and a diminishing effect of economic growth).
Second, a high resistance to intratemporal substitution justifies a lower EDR for all time horizons (relative to Cobb-Douglas). For example, the short term EDR under certainty and ( ) is about 0.9% lower than in the Cobb-Douglas case (2.5% versus 3.4%) and it is more than 2% lower than the case of perfect substitution (which implies that the short term EDR equals 4.8%).
Third, under the VES specification, the EDR initially decreases and then increases with the time horizon. The U-shape of the EDR was discussed in 18 In this setting the environmental share is neither constant across time nor across states of nature. When we refer to a higher environmental share in our discussion what we mean is that the share is expected to be higher at a given point in time. The same remark applies to the resistance to intratemporal substitution as well as to our references of a positive or negative substitution effect.
Section 6 within a non-stochastic framework. In our numerical example consumption is expected to become relatively more abundant over time, and this implies that the resistance to intratemporal substitution and the environmental share are expected to increase over time. Since the substitution effect is initially positive, a higher resistance to intratemporal substitution and a higher environmental share both work in the same direction to decrease the discount rate. As the resistance to intratemporal substitution increases further, the substitution effect eventually becomes negative but diminishing in strength, so the EDR starts to rise at a decreasing rate until it settles at its long run level.
Fourth, uncertainty has a quite significant negative effect on the short-term EDR under the VES specification. For example, under the high volatility scenario, the precautionary effect implies an EDR that is 1.6% lower than the case of certainty. The reason for uncertainty to have a large negative effect on the EDR is, again, increasing resistance to intratemporal substitution. This is evident from comparing Figures 1 and 2: In the case with CES utility and the precautionary effect is lower than in the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences.
At least for the current specification of preferences, however, the large precautionary effect under VES preferences is only a short-term effect. As the resistance to intratemporal substitution reaches its constant long term level and the environmental share increases over time the effect of uncertainty becomes negligible. In fact, over medium-term horizons, uncertainty increases the EDR. Consistent with our discussion in Section 5 (recall the positive cross-prudence effect when ), this suggests that an increase in risk aversion may also increase the EDR. This is confirmed in Figure 3 for a very large increase in risk aversion. However, contrary to changes in the resistance to intertemporal inequality, more reasonable changes in risk aversion have almost negligible effects on the EDR.
For completeness, in Figure 4 we also consider the VES specification but with a relative low resistance to intertemporal inequality as in the Stern Review ( ). The pattern observed confirms our previous analysis. Limited betweengood substitutability implies a substantially lower EDR than in the case with perfect substitutability (which implies, under certainty, a long-term discount rate equal to the growth rate of consumption ). Compared to the case with , the lower resistance to intertemporal inequality implies a lower short-term discount rate, a higher long-term discount rate, and smaller precautionary effects (that are positive over medium-term horizons). Importantly, even though the environmental share is increasing and the substitution effect is always negative, which would imply that the EDR is increasing under CES, the EDR initially decreases due to increasing resistance to substitution over the goods. ⁄ and which implies ( ) and ( ) We also assume that and has a lognormal distribution with expected growth and volatility (low risk) or (high risk). To summarize, our numerical analysis suggests that attitudes towards substitution over time, over the goods, and over states of nature all play an important role in the determination of the ecological discount rate. Based on our calculations, we think that a reasonable level for the environmental discount rate is about 1% to 2% above the rate of time preference for short horizons and about 1% to 2% below the rate of time preference for medium and long term horizons. So far we have used . If we take a more conservative approach and set we have that the short-term EDR should be about 3% to 4% and the medium and long term EDR should be about 0% to 1%. These discount rates are substantially lower than the discount rate implied by the classical discounting framework and they are also substantially lower (for medium and long term horizons) than the ecological discount rate that Gollier (2010a) estimated using a Cobb-Douglas utility. While it is important to take our (as well as others') numbers with care due to the calibration of a large number of parameters for which little is known, the more important message is that disentangling the different aspects of preferences is crucial for properly discounting future environmental impacts.
Concluding Remarks
We have made considerable progress in disentangling how different aspects of social preferences interact with the evolution of natural and man-made resources to determine the ecological discount rate and its behavior over time. We showed that the weight that society places on environmental amenities, the degree of substitutability between consumption and environmental quality, the degree of risk aversion, and the rate of change of these attitudes as natural and man-made resources evolve stochastically over time are all important determinants of the ecological discount rate. Furthermore, we showed that disentangling attitudes towards risk from attitudes towards intertemporal inequality is also crucial for establishing an appropriate rate to discount future environmental impacts.
The punch-line of both our theoretical and numerical analysis is that environmentalists do have a reason to be skeptical of the classical approach to social discounting as applied to environmental impacts. By assuming perfect substitutability of consumption and environmental resources, Ramsey's classic rule can grossly underestimate the present value of future environmental impacts. Therefore, while we believe that the criticism of the low discount rate used in the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change is well grounded, its proposal for immediate and decisive action towards climate change mitigation may be correct after all. But the reason for this is completely different from the reason in Stern's Review (i.e. little concern over intergenerational inequality). To reach this conclusion we need a much richer discounting framework, one that takes into account the complex interaction of attitudes towards substitution over time, over the goods, and over states of nature.
While our numerical analysis has served well the purpose of depicting the complex interaction of social preferences with the stochastic evolution of material and environmental resources, it can clearly be improved upon by evaluating a more complete model of the dynamics of consumption and environmental quality and the feedback effects between them and by estimating empirically the parameters that capture the different attitudes towards substitution. We expect to take on these challenges in future research.
Appendix
A. Proofs of Results in Section 4
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We will begin by establishing the relation between our results and those obtained by Gollier (2010a 
A.2. Taylor series approximation
To derive Eq. (6), consider a second order Taylor series approximation of [ ( )] ( ) around ( ). We have, suppressing dependences to avoid notational clutter and using the definitions of the growth rates and covariances in the text, Eliminating terms that go to zero faster than and we have 
Using (A.3)-(A.8) above and after some algebraic manipulations we find that the EDR is approximately equal to Eq.(6).
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Under specification (2) the EDR can be written as Plugging (A.10) and (A.11) back into (A.9) and simplifying we obtain Eq. (12) in the text.
C. Proof of Propositions 3
The EDR under certainty is 
which is Eq. (14) in the text.
Eqs (15-18) follow by applying l'Hopital's rule to the limits of ̂ ( )
D. Details of simulations in Section 7
The EDR under specification (3) is given by 
